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RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDER TO ATTACK TRANS-
ACTIONS OCCURRING PRIOR TO HIS
ACQUISITION OF STOCK
By DAVID S. SYKES*
An analysis of the decisions dealing with the question
of whether or not a subsequent stockholder may attack,
in a derivative action, transactions occurring prior to his
acquisition of stock shows that the weight of authority
and sound reason support the stockholder in such a suit.'
The following jurisdictions allow such a suit to be main-
tained by a subsequent stockholder if he be not barred
by laches, estoppel or otherwise: 2 England, Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Utah and Delaware.
A number of State Courts, however, have followed the
rule promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United
States,8 which requires that in a secondary action by a
stockholder it must be alleged, inter alia, that he was a
stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A. B., 1932, Johns Hopkins University;
LL. B., 1935, University of Maryland.
I BALLENTiNE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) 625; MACHEN, CORPORATIONS
(1908) Sec. 1169; 4 CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 3220; 1 MoRAwvNz,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) 254, See. 266; MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
(1938) 2253; 9 FLarcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (1920) Sec. 5980,
5981.
2 Seaton v. Grant, L. R. 2 Ch. 459; Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 8
So. 788 (1891); Harvey v. Meigs, 17 Cal. App. 353, 119 Pac. 941 (1911);
Scully et al. v. Auto Finance Co., 11 Del. Ch. 355, 101 A. 908 (1917);
Just v. Idaho Canal Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102 Pac. 381 (1909); Chicago
v. Camerson, 22 Ill. App. 91, aff. 120 I1. 447, 11 N. E. 899 (1886) ; Mason
v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 A. 1030 (1909) ; German Corp. v. Negaunee
German Aid Soc., 172 Mich. 650, 138 N. W. 343 (1912) ; Forrester v. Bos-
ton Mining Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898); Winsor v. Bailey, 55
N. H. 218 (1875); Appleton v. American Malting Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 375,
54 A. 454 (1903); Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N. Y. 11, 94 N. E. 1088 (1911) ;
Dissette v. Publishing Co., 9 Ohio Cire. Ct. (N. S.) 118 (dicta); North
v. Union Savings & Loan Assn., 59 Ore. 483, 117 Pac. 822 (1911); Raf-
ferty v. Donnelly, 197 Pa. 423, 47 A. 202 (1900) ; Robertson v. Draney,
53 Utah 263, 178 Pac. 35 (1919).
8 Originally Equity Rule 94, promulgated by the Supreme Court of
the United States January 23, 1882. By amendment of 1912 this Rule
was slightly changed and became known as Equity Rule 27. It is now
Rule 23 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts
of the United States, which Rules were adopted by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934, Chapter 651 (48 Stat. 1064).
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complains, or that his stock thereafter devolved on him
by operation of law. The following states have been gen-
erally cited as requiring that the stockholder complainant
be a stockholder as of the time of the transaction com-
plained of: 4 Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina and Washington.
Many of the decisions of the above enumerated courts
could have rested upon basic principles of equity, and the
stockholder could. have been precluded from maintaining
the suit upon the particular facts of the case upon such
grounds as estoppel, acquiescence, or laches, without re-
lying on the principle that the stockholder was barred
merely because he acquired his stock subsequent to the
contested transaction. These cases will be discussed else-
where.
Some text writers have placed Maryland within this
group of so-called "minority cases," on the strength of the
language of the Court in Matthews v. Headley Chocolate
Co.5 This case will be analyzed later in this article, and
the writer hopes to demonstrate that such a construction
is untenable.
The starting point for the weighing of these two op-
posing views must necessarily involve a consideration of
the basic rights of a stockholder in the assets of a corpo-
ration and the duties of the management of the corpora-
tion to him.
In Morawetz on Private Corporations6 it is said:
"It has been pointed out that the estate of a cor-
poration is to be treated as that of a continuing insti-
tution, irrespective of the members at any particular
'Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Col. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907); Alexander v.
Searcy, 81 Ga. 536, 8 S. E. 630 (1889) ; Clark v. American Coal, 86 Iowa
436, 53 N. W. 291 (1892) ; Neff v. Gas & Electric Shop, 232 Ky. 66, 22 S. W.
(2d) 265 (1929), noted (1930) Ky. L. J. 387; Home Fire Ins. Co. v.
Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903); Rankin et al v. Brewery
& Ice Co. et al., 12 N. M. 54, 73 Pac. 614 (1903); Moore v. Silver Val-
ley Mining Co., 104 N. C. 534, 10 S. E. 679 (1890); (this case hardly
belongs in this classification although textwriters generally place It there) ;
Pitcher v. Lone Pine-Surprise Consol. Min. Co., 39 Wash. 608, 81 Pac.
1047 (1905).
5 130 Md. 523, 102 A. 920, L. R. A. 1918C 1181 (1917).
6 MoaAwE-z, op. vit. supra, n. 1, Sec. 265.
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time composing it. Each share represents an inter-
est in the entire concern, and the several holders are
entitled to equal rights irrespective of the time when
they acquired their shares. Causes of action belong-
ing to the corporation increase the value of the cor-
porate estate, and must be treated like any other as-
sets; when enforced, they inure to the benefit of all
the stockholders without distinction. It is plain, there-
fore, that a stockholder has an interest in all causes
of action belonging to the corporation, whether they
arose before or after he purchased his shares. If the
courts decline to protect this interest in any particu-
lar case, their refusal must be based upon some prin-
ciple of public policy, or the personal disqualification
of the plaintiff."
The same writer, along with others 7 criticizes a rule
which would cut off the rights of the transferee of shares
of stock, rights which were allowed the assignor and which
were inherently in the stock.
"If purchasers were disqualified from protecting
their interests under these circumstances, the trans-
ferable value of shares might be impaired, and the
loss would fall upon the innocent holders who were
wronged.""
Before a suit may be maintained by a stockholder in
behalf of the corporation for wrongs committed against
it, all courts agree that the proper foundation must be es-
tablished. Efforts must be first made to have the wrong
redressed through the corporation, and the bill of com-
plaint must allege that a demand has been made upon the
board of directors or other managing body to act for the
corporation and that no action has been taken; or, failing
to allege such a demand, it must fully set forth the rea-
son for such failure, such as that because of the adverse
interest of the majority of the board of directors or other
managing body such a demand would be futile.9
Seasongood, Stockholder Suing for Corporation (1907) 21 Harv. L.
Rev. 195.
OMoBAwETrZ, op. oit., supra, n. 1, Sec. 266.
9MACHEN, op. cit., 8upra, n. 1, Sec. 1145 et seq.; Booth v. Robinson, 55
Md. 419, 439 (1881).
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It is also essential that such a complainant be free from
any disqualification. He must be a bona fide stockholder; 10
a mere nominee representing a rival company is not a
bona fide stockholder." He must not have been guilty of
any conduct amounting to participation, acquiescence, es-
toppel or laches.12 So too, having taken the stock subject
to all of its infirmities, the complainant stockholder must
necessarily be barred by the conduct of his predecessor
in title such as participation, acquiescence, estoppel or
laches, for the sale of stock cannot pass any greater rights
than those possessed by the vendor. 8
The right of the stockholder to sue in behalf of the
corporation, thus limited by the established principles of
equity jurisprudence, is necessary for the protection of
the corporation from the fraud, breach of fiduciary obli-
gation, or oppressive conduct by those in control of the
corporation. If the stockholder has complied with all of
the preliminary requirements above mentioned, he should
be allowed to maintain his secondary action regardless of
the time of his purchasing the stock of the corporation.
Allowing such an action must have only the most salu-
tary effect in deterring and preventing unlawful acts by
those in control of the corporation which might accrue
to their own advantage and be adverse to the interests of
the corporation and its minority stockholders. To disal-
low such an action would be to offer opportunity to the
wrongdoers to hide behind the cloak of technicality to
protect their illgotten gains.
The Federal Rule 4 (Equity Rule 94) was promulgated
immediately after the Court had decided the case of Hawes
v. Contra Costa Water Co.15 That decision, and the rule
embodying it, was the Court's manifestation of its dis-
pleasure at stockholders, under the doctrine of Dodge v.
1 0 Moore v. Silver Valley Mining Co., 8upra, n. 4.
Breeze v. Lone Pine-Surprise Consol. Min. Co., 39 Wash. 602, 81 Pac.
1050 (1905); Runcie v. Corn Exchange Trust Co., 6 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
616 (1938).
"Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., supra, n. 5.
', Ibid.
"Supra, n. 3.
"104 U. S. 450, 26 L. Ed. 827 (1882).
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Woolsey, 16 coming into the Federal Courts to enforce cor-
porate causes of action when there would have been no
jurisdiction in the Federal Courts had the corporation it-
self attempted to bring action. Supreme Court dicta in
Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co." and some state courts,
apparently moved by other considerations, have treated
this Rule as one of substantive law. That the Rule is
merely one of procedure has been the view adopted by
the majority of the state courts. s Some Federal Courts
have also taken the view that the Rule was adopted only
as a jurisdictional matter.1 9
In a recent treatise on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure"° it was said that if Rule 23 (b) "is substantive in
character, then it is subject to challenge in the Federal
Courts held in those states which have no such require-
ment, namely, the majority of American states. The rea-
son for this is that the Federal Rules can validly regulate
only procedure; and if the requirement is substantive, the
Federal Courts must now apply the state common law by
virtue of the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkin's.' '21
Such a contention was made in the recent Federal Dis-
trict Court case of Summers et al. v. Hearst et al.2 2 and
the court held that contention untenable. There the court
indicated that it might have felt itself compelled to follow
the New York case of Pollitz v. Gould,23 regardless of the
Federal general law, were it not for the fact that the prin-
ciple of Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co.24 had been em-
bodied in an equity rule promulgated by the Supreme
18 18 How. 331, 15 L. Ed. 401 (1856).
17 110 U. S. 209, 28 L. Ed. 121, 35 S. Ct. 573 (1884); Venner v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 153 F. 408 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1907).11 Supra, n. 2. On this point see Seasongood, supra u. 7; and (1922) 6
Marquette L. Rev. 170.19 McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 22 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md.
1938); Hand v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 55 Fed. (2d) 712, (S. D.
N. Y. 1931); Lindsiey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 162 F. 954 (C. C.S. D. N. Y. 1908); Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany Susquehanna Ry.
Co. et al., 213 U. S. 435, 53 L. Ed. 862, 29 S. Ct. 540 (1909).
20 MOORE, Op. cit., supra n. 1, 2253.
21304 U. S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
2223 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).




Court. In other words, the court held that the rule was
not one of substantive law, but was merely procedure.
The very fact that this requirement has been made
the subject of a rule of civil procedure for the lower Fed-
eral Courts by the Supreme Court of the United States,
under authority granted to it by Congress, is answer
enough to those who contend that this requirement is one
of substantive law.
Most of the State decisions following the Federal Rule
could have reached the same result, in perfect harmony
with the decisions of the English or majority courts, upon
well established principles of equity jurisprudence.
In the Nebraska case of Home Fire Insurance Co. v.
Barber,'2 5 wherein Dean Pound, then Commissioner, vigor-
ously championed the cause of the Federal Rule as one of
substantive law, it was said:
"In other words, the present stockholders are con-
testing acts through which they get title to a large por-
tion of their stock, and acts which those through whom
they derived the greater part of the remainder could
not have challenged because they participated there-
in
In this case one of the stockholders who acted as agent
for the sale of the stock, some of which was his own stock,
was the alleged principal wrongdoer, and all of the other
stockholders apparently had consented or acquiesced in
the transaction contested. The opinion further stated:
"It appears to be well settled, also, that stockhold-
ers who have acquired their shares and their interest
in the corporation from the alleged wrongdoers and
through the prior mismanagement have no standing
to complain thereof."
Another reason why the court thought relief improper
was that "it would enable them (present stockholders) to
recover back a large part of the purchase money they paid
and agreed to pay for the stock, notwithstanding the stock
was worth all that they paid for it, and notwithstanding
they obtained and now retain all that they bargained for."
2 Supra, n. 4.
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The court, conceding that all of the present stockhold-
ers were barred from relief, held that the corporate en-
tity should be disregarded and relief denied the corpora-
tion except as to items converted by the defendant.
Clearly had this suit been brought by a stockholder
acquiring his stock under the circumstances of this case
recovery could have been disallowed upon substantive
equitable principles, and the court need not have discussed
the Federal Rule. Since the suit was brought by the cor-
poration, it became necessary to look behind the corporate
entity and to preclude a recovery which would have been
denied had the suit been brought by such a stockholder
in behalf of the Corporation. However, it was hardly
necessary for the court to have unqualifiedly held any sub-
sequent stockholder disqualified from maintaining a de-
rivative action merely because his stock might have been
acquired after the contested transaction.
In the Georgia case of Alexander v. Searcy,2 6 wherein
it was erroneously said "the weight of authority seems to
be that a person who did not own stock at the time of the
transaction complained of cannot complain or bring suit
to have them declared illegal," the stockholders had been
guilty of acquiescence for seven to fifteen years; and there
was not shown a demand upon the directors to conduct
the litigation, nor was any reason for a failure to make
such a demand shown. Although fault may be found with
the invocation of the Federal Rule, there can be little
doubt but that the courts applying the English rule would
have come to the same conclusion upon the facts of the
case.
In Moore v. Silver Valley Mining Co. 27 and in Bolden-
weck v. Bullis28 wherein the complainants were held pre-
cluded from attacking the transaction complained of, the
complainants were estopped by laches. In the former case






tiff had sought redress within the corporation, nor that
he had brought suit in the state wherein the corporation
and all defendants, save one, were resident, nor did it ap-
pear plaintiff was a bona fide owner of stock. In the lat-
ter case plaintiff's stock appeared to have participated in
the transaction contested.
In Breeze v. Lone Pine-Surprise Consol. Min. Co. 29 and
in Clark v. American Co.30 the plaintiff stockholders were
not bona fide stockholders, a fact which would disqualify
them under general principles of equity.
It is indeed to be regretted that the above courts have
based their decisions upon a misapplication of a rule of
practice31 which was adopted to correct a jurisdictional
matter, when such decisions could have been based upon
sound principles of equity. By so misapplying this Rule,
they have brought about a rule of substantive law which
is clearly in disfavor among the majority of courts.3 2
In the beginning of this article the Maryland case of
Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co.33 was referred to as
being placed by some text writers within the minority
rule. This suit was brought in equity in the name of the
corporation against its former directors for an accounting
of excessive salaries voted by them to two of their num-
ber as officers. As the case came before the Court of Ap-
peals on the lower court's ruling on the demurrer to the
bill, the question before that Court was whether or not
the bill was maintainable in the name of the corporation.
The Court, in affirming the action of the lower court in
overruling the demurrers to the amended bill of complaint,
held that inasmuch as those who were the minority stock-
holders at the time of the transactions complained of were
now able to have the suit brought in the name of the
corporation, a suit so brought could be maintained so long
as recovery was limited "to the extent of the proportions
S upra, n. 11 (companion case to Pitcher v. Lone Pine-Surprise Consol.
Min. Co., supra, n. 4).Supra, n. 4.
'z MACHEN, Op. cit., supra, n. 1, Sec. 1171; MouAwErz, op. cit., supra,





of the sum recovered due such minority stockholders, if
any, as are not barred by laches, limitations, acquiescence,
or other way sufficient to bar them in equity, and anything
recovered should be directed to be paid to them by the
corporation."
The ruling of the Court of Appeals also precluded the
purchasers of the controlling interest, who had caused the
suit to be initiated in the name of the corporation and
whose assignor had committed the alleged wrong, from
sharing in the recoverey on the ground that they could
not have any greater rights than their vendor. This part
of the decision is indeed most interesting, but it is hardly
within the scope of this article.
As stated before, the real question before the Court
was whether or not the Corporation had stated a good
cause of action, yet the Court in reaching its conclusion
(which was undoubtedly most equitable under the par-
ticular facts of the case) discussed the authorities which
unconditionally deny the right of a subsequent stockholder
to maintain a suit in behalf of the Corporation for trans-
actions committed prior to said stockholder's acquisition
of stock. In the next succeeding paragraphs, the Court,
without distinction, intermingled authorities apparently
following the Federal Rule and those following the Eng-
lish or New York decisions. However, all of these cases
cited have a "common denominator", to wit, "estoppel".
The Court then stated:
"If this was a suit by stockholders, it would seem
to us to be clear that holders of stock who become
such after the transactions complained of took place,
should not be permitted to recover against the di-
rectors."
Chief Judge Boyd, in the same paragraph concluded
that:
"... those who held over 75 per cent of the stock
were the same persons who constituted the board of
directors, and it is clear under the authorities that
they should not be given relief in a Court of Equity
[VOL. IV
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from what they themselves did, when acting in the
capacity of directors."
"We are also of the opinion that the assignees of
Matthews are likewise not entitled to recover."
It is the writer's conviction that the Court of Appeals
was not attempting to bring Maryland into the "minority
camp" on the principle under discussion, but rather that
the Court was following the well recognized principle of
estoppel and the principle that the vendee acquires no
greater right than those possessed by his vendor.
The taking of such a point of view would explain clearly
the reasons for the Court's discussing a question other-
wise irrelevant and it would furnish the basis for the un-
usual decree allowing recovery by the corporation as a
trustee.
To take any other view would relegate that which the
Court said relative to derivative suits by subsequent stock-
holders to the realm of dicta.34
An examination of the briefs in this case shows that
counsel for appellants in their very learned brief cited
the case of Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, in support
of their argument that if any relief was due, it should be
granted only to a small minority of the stockholders indi-
vidually and not to the assignees of Matthews who were
bound by his acts. Counsel contended it would be un-
just to grant a decree which would double the value of
the stock of the vendees at the expense of the vendor;
that such a decree would result in the assignees getting
from Matthews a larger sum even than they paid him for
his stock. That this result would be inequitable appel-
lants cited the Barber case and the case of Alexander,
Trustee v. Searcy, wherein, as the quoted paragraph in
appellant's brief shows, the complainants sought to attack
transactions which were brought about by their predeces-
sors in title.
Nowhere in the brief is it intimated that a subsequent
stockholder acquiring his stock from one who had not been
"But see Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 489 (1854) as to
whether or not dicta become authoritative law in this state.
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disqualified in any way could not maintain an action in
behalf of the corporation.
The Court of Appeals followed the logical and well
written brief of the appellants and approved of the prin-
ciples therein stated and the cases therein cited, but, un-
fortunately, the Court, in dealing with the Barber case,
went a great deal further than was necessary and proper
in using the unqualified language that it used.
Should the question of the stockholder's right to sue,
for transactions occurring prior to such stockholder's ac-
quisition of stock, where such stockholder or his assignor
has not been disqualified from suing by general prin-
ciples of equity, arise in Maryland, it is hoped that the
Court of Appeals will explain its language in the Headley
Chocolate case. If it regards that language as dicta, it is
hoped that it will rule contrary. thereto.
It is true that the majority rule, permitting a subse-
quent stockholder to champion the cause of the corpora-
tion, affords an opportunity to a speculator to buy up a few
shares of stock and maintain a "nuisance suit" for personal
gain.
In answer to those who favor the minority rule because
of this possibility of so-called "legalized blackmail", the
writer again refers to Morawetz on Private Corporations,"5
wherein it is said:
"Courts cannot investigate the secret intentions of
parties, or refuse to protect their apparent and sub-
stantial rights by reason of some ulterior improper de-
sign. The purpose with which a shareholder obtained
his shares and began the litigation should merely be
considered as a circumstance tending to discredit his
case."
It must be borne in mind that the relief sought in a
minority stockholder's bill of complaint is on behalf of the
Corporation, and, accordingly, any relief granted will inure
to the benefit of the Corporation, the individual stock-
holder merely deriving an incidental benefit therefrom.
35 1 MORAWgr2, PRIVATPE CORPORAnONS (2d Ud. 1886) 254, Sec. 266.
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Courts of Equity have erected a formidable barrier in
front of stockholders' bills by requiring the stockholder to
be free from any disqualification and to lay the proper
foundation for the relief prayed. 6 If the stockholder is
qualified, has exhausted his means of remedy within the
corporation, and has shown a case of apparent and sub-
stantive rights, the right to relief to the Corporation should
not be denied. The honest and faithful director will not
complain if the suit will result in favor of the Corporation,
and the director whose conduct constitutes the gravamen
of the bill should not be heard to complain. The fact that
some few suits may be instituted without foundation and
for purely improper purposes, is not a sufficient reason to
repudiate the majority rule and eliminate a strong deter-
rent to the disloyal and self-serving management.
S6 Spra, circa notes 9 to 13.
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